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a b s t r a c t
Critical infrastructures are vital assets for the public safety, economic welfare and national
security of countries. Cyber systems are used extensively to monitor and control critical
infrastructures. A number of infrastructures are connected to the Internet via corporate
networks. Cyber security is, therefore, an important item of the national security agenda of
a country. The intense interest in cyber security has initiated research focusing on national
cyber security maturity assessments. However, little, if any, research is dedicated to
maturity assessments of national critical infrastructure protection efforts. Instead, the vast
majority of studies merely examine diverse national-level security best practices ranging
from cyber crime response to privacy protection.
This paper proposes a maturity model for measuring the readiness levels of national
critical infrastructure protection efforts. The development of the model involves two steps.
The first step analyzes data pertaining to national cyber security projects using grounded
theory to extract the root causes of the susceptibility of critical infrastructures to cyber
threats. The second step determines the maturity criteria by introducing the root causes to
subject-matter experts polled in a Delphi survey. The resulting survey-based maturity
model is applied to assess the critical infrastructure protection efforts in Turkey. The
results are realistic and intuitively appealing, demonstrating that the maturity model is
useful for evaluating the national critical infrastructure protection preparedness of
developing countries such as Turkey.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A physical or cyber infrastructure is designated as a critical
infrastructure if its disruption or damage would have a
harmful effect on the economy, social order and/or national
security of a country [1]. The term critical infrastructure was
first used in Executive Order 13010 issued by President
Clinton in 1996 [2]. The executive order identified two types
of threats against critical infrastructures – physical threats
and cyber threats.
Although critical infrastructures have existed long before
the widespread use of the Internet and cyber technologies,
critical infrastructure protection has become a high govern-
mental priority after the proliferation of cyber systems in
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2016.10.001
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infrastructure assets. The cyber systems expose the under-
lying infrastructures to cyber threats that are asymmetric in
nature. A cyber attack has the obvious advantages of anon-
ymity, deniability, affordability and ease of use compared
with conventional attacks. Indeed, cyber threats easily and
effortlessly pave the way for harmful attacks against critical
infrastructure assets. The proliferation of cyber systems has
also increased the interdependencies between critical infra-
structures. These interdependencies are the main cause of
cascading failures that can affect multiple infrastructures
[3,4].
Cyber systems, especially SCADA systems and distributed
control systems, are widely used to monitor and control
critical infrastructures. These industrial control systems are
used in power grids, oil and gas pipelines, and water supply
and transportation systems. Some critical infrastructure sec-
tors such as finance and telecommunications are completely
dependent on, or composed of, conventional cyber systems.
Because of new service models such as cloud computing, the
networking and Internet infrastructure can be regarded as a
component of the critical infrastructure of a country. The
2007 attacks on networks in Estonia demonstrated how much
the social and economic well-being of a country is dependent
on its Internet infrastructure.
Despite its physically distributed structure, the Internet is
logically a single medium. The Internet brings physically
distributed people, organizations and nations together. The
medium is shared with different types of cyber attackers with
different motivations; the attackers range from cyber crim-
inals to state-sponsored entities. A number of critical infra-
structures are connected to the Internet over corporate
networks [5]. This has led to a number of recorded cyber
attacks against critical infrastructures such as nuclear plants,
electrical grids, flight control systems and harbors [6,7].
As a result of the increased threats and actual attacks, the
cyber resilience of critical infrastructures has become an
important requirement of national security. A maturity
model that measures its national critical infrastructure pro-
tection capability could guide a country in implementing and
refining its cyber resilience efforts. However, in the current
research literature, there is no study that specifically focuses
on a maturity model for national critical infrastructure
protection efforts. Some country-level cyber security maturity
models have been proposed, but the information about the
models and their results is limited. Other studies have been
conducted by regional and international organizations. How-
ever, these studies focus on scoring and ranking countries
according to their national-level cyber security best practices.
This paper addresses the gap in the research literature by
proposing a model for measuring the maturity of the critical
infrastructure protection efforts of a country. The maturity
criteria are determined using a Delphi survey of subject-
matter experts. The information provided to the experts
before conducting the survey was based on national project
data for Turkey. A unique feature of the proposed maturity
model is the source of its criteria. Unlike other studies, the
maturity criteria are not based on the cyber security best
practices of a country, but on the actual cyber posture of the
country derived from expert opinion. Another important
feature of the survey-based maturity model is that it involved
the (unofficial) participation of government officials; other
studies that score national efforts generally involve security
experts, not government officials. Finally, the proposed
maturity model engages a simple maturity formula that
incorporates maturity criteria and their weights, and partici-
pant assessments of the maturity levels of the country of
interest with respect to the criteria.
2. Literature review
This section summarizes and compares six studies related to
national cyber security maturity assessment. Cyber security
is the main focus of four of the six studies. The remaining
two studies consider cyber security as a parameter of
national cyber power. Two studies were performed by aca-
demic entities whereas four studies were conducted by
regional or international organizations, or governments.
The Community Cyber Security Maturity Model (CCSMM)
[8], which was developed in a government-funded academic
study, assesses holistic cyber security programs at five
maturity levels and provides guidance on moving forward
to the higher maturity levels. The model checks the existence
of various cyber security best practices to determine the
maturity level; however, it does not provide a detailed, pre-
defined list of countermeasures corresponding to each
maturity level. Moreover, the upper levels of the maturity
model are not fully developed because no entity currently has
these maturity levels [8]. The model can be adapted to the
requirements of different targets – organizations, commu-
nities, nations and even individuals. The countermeasures
may vary according to the maturity level as well as the type
of target. The model has been applied to eleven communities
in five U.S. states. However, details of the study are not
shared. Additionally, there is currently no national-level
application of the model.
The National Cyber Security Maturity Model (NCSecMM) [9]
provides guidance to a region or country for measuring its
current security status. The National Cyber Security Maturity
Model is holistic like the Community Cyber Security Maturity
Model [8]. It includes an application framework, roles and
responsibilities matrix, implementation guidance and matur-
ity model. It is essentially an adaptation of some of the ISO
27000 standards and CoBIT framework countermeasures to
the national context. The National Cyber Security Maturity
Model framework includes 34 cyber security processes in five
groups. The maturity level of each process is measured
individually according to a five-level maturity model adapted
from the CoBIT framework. However, the National Cyber
Security Maturity Model has not been applied to the national
context as yet.
The Cyber Readiness Index was proposed by Melissa
Hathaway [10], the former Acting Senior Director for Cyber-
space at the U.S. National Security Council. The cyber security
efforts of 35 countries have been assessed according to best
practices specified by Hathaway using publicly available data
from government websites. The maturity levels of the coun-
tries are not represented qualitatively or quantitatively and
the study concludes that “no country is cyber ready” [10].
Hathaway explains that the goal of the study was “to spark
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Table 1 – Summary of maturity models.
Model Developer Description Main
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Antonio, USA (Academic
Institution)
Holistic maturity model for determining
the cyber security postures of
organizations, communities and nations
Cyber
security




Mohammad V University at
Souissi, Morocco (Academic
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countries that includes a framework,
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international discussion and inspire global interest in addres-
sing the economic erosion from cyber insecurity that is
holding back more robust economic growth.”
The Global Cybersecurity Index [11], developed for the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), has been used
to assess the cyber security maturity levels of 104 countries.
The maturity level of a country is determined based on 17
criteria in five domains derived from the International Tele-
communication Union's Global Cybersecurity Agenda [12].
The evaluations were performed using data extracted from
internal International Telecommunication Union databases
and publicly available resources in 90 countries; only 14
countries provided data specifically for the study. The matur-
ity level of a country is expressed as a normalized value
between zero and one. According to the International Tele-
communication Union [11], the index has a low level of
granularity because it seeks to express the cyber security
preparedness of a country and not its detailed vulnerabilities.
The 104 countries were ranked from the highest to the lowest
maturity levels. There were a total of 29 different maturity
levels, meaning that several countries had the same maturity
levels.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute [13] has con-
ducted a cyber maturity analysis of 14 countries in the
Asia-Pacific region along with the United Kingdom and
United States. The study does not focus solely on cyber
security; instead, cyber security is considered to be a dimen-
sion of the general cyber maturity of a country. The evalua-
tion criteria and their relative weights were determined with
the assistance of experts from government, private sector
and academia. The countries were assessed and scored based
on publicly available data. The maturity assessment results
are presented as percentages and the countries are ranked
from the highest to the lowest percentage values.
The Cyber Power Index was created by Booz Allen Hamil-
ton [14] to assess the cyber power of 19 G-20 countries, not
including the European Union. Cyber security is not the main
focus of the study, but it is, instead, a dimension of the cyber
power of a country. The weights of the criteria and the
answer choices were determined by a panel of experts. The
main sources of data for the evaluations were the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, UNESCO, World Bank and
The Economist Intelligence Unit.
Table 1 summarizes the six models discussed in the
literature along with their attributes. The Community Cyber
Security Maturity Model and the National Cyber Security
Maturity Model are country-level cyber security maturity
assessment models. Four of the models are used to score
and sort countries according to their maturity levels. The
Cyber Readiness Index and the Global Cybersecurity Index
provide country-level scores that are focused on cyber
security.
All six models produce maturity evaluations by perform-
ing the following two steps in sequence:
1. A set of criteria is specified based on best practices and/or
publicly available information sources.
2. A country is evaluated using publicly available data and
(sometimes) using questionnaires.
Ideally, maturity model criteria should be grounded on
actual country data and vulnerabilities. After creating the
maturity model, measurements may be performed by the
relevant government officials. These customizations serve to
increase the accuracy of the maturity model. The resulting
model is of more utility to a country with regard to evaluating
its current cyber security posture and the requirements of
prospective studies.
These customizations were performed for the maturity
model described in this paper. Instead of simply assessing
the general national cyber security posture, the resulting
maturity model specifically evaluates the critical infrastruc-
ture protection efforts of a country. This is of great value
because critical infrastructure protection is a common and
most vital agenda item in the national cyber security strate-
gies of countries around the world.
3. Motivation, research data and methodology
The basic construct of a maturity model is its maturity
criteria. If the criteria are determined by analyzing the actual
security posture of a country, then the current situation and
progress can be observed more reliably using the maturity
model. The first author of this paper was the manager of a
state-sponsored project focusing on information security
management in critical infrastructures. The project specifi-
cally analyzed the cyber dependence of Turkish critical
infrastructure assets. The results revealed that the critical
infrastructure assets are susceptible to cyber threats because
of the inherent vulnerabilities that stem from the use of cyber
systems. The authors of this paper analyzed the project data
to discover the possible reasons for the susceptibility of the
Turkish critical infrastructure to cyber threats. This analysis
constituted the first step in developing the proposed maturity
model. The second step involved the use of a Delphi survey to
determine the criteria based on the root causes of the
susceptibility of the Turkish critical infrastructure to cyber
threats.
Fig. 1 shows the steps involved in developing the maturity
model. The root causes of the susceptibility of critical infra-
structures to cyber threats were extracted from project data
using grounded theory. Grounded theory is an interpretive,
qualitative and inductive data analysis method; fundamen-
tally, it involves the discovery of theory through the analysis
of data [15].
In the research, qualitative data was rigorously coded and
the codes were categorized during the open coding phase.
Categories were compared to find the themes during the axial
coding phase. Redundant, trivial and irrelevant themes were
eliminated to extract the theory during the selective
coding phase.
The project data comprised interview texts and various
types of official documents. Data collection and interviews
were performed until theoretical saturation; this is the point
at which no new data appears and all concepts in the theory
are well-developed.
Nine semi-structured interviews were performed. The
interviewees were mid-level managers and employees of
information processing departments of critical infrastructure
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assets. The interviews provided focused, in-depth and rich
data of the phenomena under analysis. The interviews
involved open-ended questions about the general security
posture, threats, potential vulnerabilities, implemented
countermeasures and weaknesses of the interviewees’ orga-
nizations and critical infrastructure sectors. The questions
were posed as initiators and catalyzers of the long-lasting
and evolving interviews.
A total of 309 documents associated with 91 government
or private organizations were collected. Most of the organiza-
tions were from the energy, telecommunications, finance,
transportation, water management and public services sec-
tors. The documents were categorized into five groups:
 Meeting minutes: These corresponded to the notes taken by
the researchers during the state-sponsored project.
 Independent evaluation reports: These corresponded to the
results of information security audits and analyses of
critical infrastructure assets performed by independent
third parties.
 Regulation texts: These corresponded to the laws and sta-
tutes that regulate the critical infrastructures considered in
the research.
 Organizational reports: These corresponded to the docu-
ments prepared by the organizations, such as annual
activity reports, annual plans and strategic plans.
 News and media reports: These corresponded to media
excerpts related to the critical infrastructures considered
in the research.
Except for the meeting minutes and independent evalua-
tion reports, all the documents listed above were, for the
most part, publicly available.
Triangulation using different sources of data was per-
formed to conduct an internal validation of the research
[16]. The meeting minutes, independent evaluation reports
and news and media reports were considered to be external
to the organizations because they were created by third
parties. On the other hand, the regulation texts and organiza-
tional reports were prepared by the organizations and were,
therefore, considered to be internal documents.
The data analysis involved three types of data coding,
which were repeated in four iterations. The fourth iteration
was the point at which theoretical saturation occurred; at this
point, the introduced data does not change the discovered
theory [17]. Because grounded theory is a process of theory
discovery rather than hypothesis testing, theoretical sam-
pling was performed between the iterations instead of
statistical sampling [18]. The researchers reshaped the inter-
view questions, types of sectors and organizations and types
of documents based on the theoretical sampling. The results
of previous iterations were presented in the semi-structured
interviews of the participants during the next iteration to
obtain their reactions, such as acceptance, rejection and
comments [19].
3.1. Extracted theory
The root causes of the susceptibility of critical infrastructures
to cyber threats were extracted after four data analysis
iterations. A total of ten root causes were identified:
1. Cyber security of critical infrastructures is not perceived
by national security authorities as a vital component of
national security.
2. Culture of information sharing, collaboration and coop-
eration within and between critical infrastructure sectors
is very limited.
3. Private sector is not perceived by the government and
governmental critical infrastructure assets as an impor-
tant stakeholder in national cyber security efforts.
4. Civil servant and public procurement laws have adverse
effects on the cyber security of governmental critical
infrastructure assets.
5. The number of qualified cyber security experts is limited.
6. Relationship management practices with product/service
providers are inadequate in governmental critical infra-
structure assets.
7. Information technology audit mechanisms are very lim-
ited or are not implemented in governmental critical
infrastructure assets.
8. Managers of governmental critical infrastructure assets do
not perceive information security as an area of
responsibility.
9. Methodical and formal risk management processes are
not conducted for governmental critical infrastructure
assets.
10. Security is considered by governmental critical infrastruc-
ture assets to be an add-on, not a design construct.
The ten root causes were verified by two cyber security
experts. Both the experts had received master's degrees and
had more than ten years of professional experience in cyber
security. Expert 1 was the main organizer of the Turkish
national cyber security exercises; he also played a role in
establishing Turkey's National Computer Security Incident
Fig. 1 – Steps in developing the maturity model.
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Response Team (CSIRT) and managed the CSIRT for six years.
Expert 2 worked on risk analysis projects involving govern-
ment organizations and critical infrastructure assets; he
participated in national-level studies related to the adapta-
tion of international standards to the Turkish context. Both
the experts agreed on the final list of root causes with minor
changes in the wording of some of the root causes to prevent
misunderstanding.
The literature analyzing the cyber security posture of
Turkey is quite limited. Academic studies and governmental
reports were reviewed to find analysis results that would
confirm or refute the root causes. The following paragraphs
compare the research findings against the existing literature:
 Root cause 1: Several articles in the literature confirm the
first root cause. Unlike developed countries, where organi-
zations with national security responsibilities play a cen-
tral role in cyber defense, the cyber security coordination
body of Turkey does not have any national security
responsibility [20]. The Turkish National CSIRT website
does not display security recommendations or bulletins
specific to critical infrastructures [21]. According to Action
Item #8 of the National Cyber Security Action Plan, an
international cyber security exercise must be organized by
the end of May 2014 [22]; however, no exercise has ever
been organized. Additionally, the National Cyber Security
Action Plan was created for the period 2013 through 2014; it
is now obsolete because no new action plan is currently in
place. The Cyber Security Council of Turkey was estab-
lished at the end of 2012 by Cabinet Decision [23]. At the
June 2013 meeting of the Cyber Security Council, the
critical infrastructure list of Turkey was updated. This
decision is in the meeting record, but is not part of a
regulation [24]. In fact, the Cyber Security Council has not
met for the past 15 months.
 Root cause 2: At this time, there are no sector-level CSIRTs
or a CSIRT specific to industrial control systems such as the
ICS-CERT in the United States, although this was urged in
Action Item #4 of the now-obsolete National Cyber Security
Action Plan. CSIRTs are important because they share
information with other CSIRTs, service providers, law
enforcement agencies and other key entities [25]. Success-
ful CSIRT operations depend on collaborative and coopera-
tive activities. The lack of security-specific organizations
such as CSIRTs is the primary reason for the lack of
information sharing, collaboration and cooperation in
Turkey. According to an Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) e-government study
[26], only 10–25% of the respondents from central and
municipal government entities collaborated with other
public sector organizations. According to the same report,
nearly 50% of the respondents emphasized that the com-
plexity of regulations prevents collaboration. Meanwhile,
the legislative infrastructure has not changed since 2007.
According to Senturk et al. [23], it is vital that governmen-
tal and privately owned critical infrastructure assets colla-
borate on critical infrastructure protection efforts, but
unfortunately no public–private partnership model is cur-
rently active in Turkey.
 Root cause 3: The contribution of the private sector to
national cyber security efforts is minimal [20]. For example,
the Cyber Security Council of Turkey does not have a
member who represents the private sector as stated in a
Cabinet Decision [27] and Electronic Communications Law
amendments [28]. The national cyber security strategy and
action plan was prepared by a governmental research
agency. The draft document was only shared with the
related public organizations as noted on the website of the
governmental research agency that prepared the strategy
[29]. Only six of the 40 participants in the national cyber
security exercise organized in 2011 were private organiza-
tions [30]. Among the 30 OECD countries, Turkey was #26 in
terms of gross domestic spending on research and devel-
opment in 2013 [31]; this statistic is an indicator of the
limited power of the private sector in Turkey.
 Root cause 4: All the interviewees from governmental
critical infrastructure assets emphasized the adverse
effects of the Civil Servants Law on the quality of employ-
ees. All the governmental organization interviewees stated
that there were three major problems with the Civil
Servants Law. First, it grants job guarantees according to
the Article 125 [32]. Second, it does not require evaluations
of technical performance. Third, Article 43 does not permit
higher salaries to be paid to exceptional employees, result-
ing in high attrition.
Three interviewees mentioned the adverse effects of public
procurement laws on critical infrastructure protection.
Specifically, governmental critical infrastructure assets
often cannot purchase needed hardware and software
due to conditions imposed by public procurement laws.
For example, public procurement laws urge the submission
of tenders in almost all instances.
 Root cause 5: The Turkish Ministry of Development recently
published a report that analyzes the problems related to
the country's information society [33]. The report states
that the available human resources do not meet the
requirements of employers in the information technology
sector. Additionally, in an employers’ association survey,
58% of the participants stated that the qualified workforce
deficit is the most important problem facing the sector [33].
In 2014, an authorized government official claimed that
there was no cyber security doctoral program at a Turkish
university and only six of Turkey's 196 universities had
master's programs in the discipline [34].
 Root cause 6: The State Supervisory Council, which works
under the charge of the Turkish Presidency, examined the
security postures of six governmental critical infrastructure
assets in 2013. According to the confidential audit report,
the owners of the information systems at the assets were
mostly private entities that were granted permission to
monitor and control the critical systems [35]. The same
report points out problems with the authorization proce-
dures of service provider personnel, security clearance
procedures, access management processes and nondisclo-
sure agreements. In summary, critical infrastructure assets
do not comply with cyber security principles when procur-
ing services and products from third parties. According
to another study [36], which evaluated the results of eight
information security management projects in governmental
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f c r i t i c a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o t e c t i o n 1 5 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 4 7 – 5 952
Table 2 – Maturity criteria determined by the Delphi survey.
Root cause of susceptibility to cyber threats Maturity criterion ðiÞ Average weight of
maturity criterion
ðWiÞ
Cyber security of critical infrastructures is not perceived
by national security authorities as a vital component of
national security
1. A critical infrastructure protection program (CIPP) that
considers cyber threats exists
2.50
2. The CIPP is managed by a governmental organization
that has national security responsibilities and
communicates with national security bodies
2.50
3. A consultant who provides technical, regulatory and
diplomatic cyber security advice to the head of the state
exists
1.67
4. Budget is allocated for critical infrastructure protection
efforts
2.50
5. Government agencies set cyber security regulations and
check their application in each critical infrastructure sector
1.83
6. A CSIRT dedicated to the protection of critical
infrastructures exists
2.00
7. A national cyber security strategy that considers the
cyber security of critical infrastructures is a part of the
national security strategy
2.17
8. Nationwide risk analysis and risk management activities
that cover all critical sectors and sector-wide risk analysis
and risk management activities are performed
2.50
Culture of information sharing, collaboration and
cooperation within and between critical infrastructure
sectors is very limited
9. A public–private partnership program has been
developed and is supported by the government
2.33
10. Regulations specifying intra- and inter-sector
information sharing and cooperation principles exist
2.00
11. Sector-based CSIRTs with information sharing
responsibilities specified in regulations exist
1.50
12. An internationally recognized national CSIRT that
cooperates with other national CSIRTs exists
2.00
13. A technical infrastructure supporting intra- and inter-
sector information sharing needs (e.g., online information
sharing portals, statistics dashboards, data collection
centers) exists
1.67
14. A national CSIRT that handles cyber incident warnings
related to critical infrastructures exists and it coordinates
with the relevant sectoral CSIRTs and critical infrastructure
assets when necessary
1.83
Private sector is not perceived by the government and
governmental critical infrastructure assets as an
important stakeholder in national cyber security efforts
15. Government policies and strategies exist that position
the private sector as a key player in national cyber security
efforts
2.50
16. Private sector participates in the development
ofnational and sectoral cyber security strategies
2.00
17. Permanent seat exists for the private sector in national
boards such as a cyber security council
1.33
18. Government leadership in innovation, research and
development activities, and identification of priority areas
related to cyber security
2.33
19. Extensive private sector participation in national cyber
security exercises
1.50
Civil servant and public procurement laws have adverse
effects on the cyber security of governmental critical
infrastructure assets
20. Critical reviews and updates of legislation affecting
critical infrastructures (especially related to the needs of
governmental critical infrastructure assets) are performed
2.50
21. Amendments to regulations exist regarding the hiring of
qualified government officials and contract personnel at
higher salaries by governmental critical infrastructure
assets
2.50
The number of qualified cyber security experts is limited 22. National capacity building plans and strategies exist 2.50
23. Critical infrastructure assets give preference to
internationally accepted certificate holders in employee
recruitment efforts
1.67
24. Adequate number of qualified cyber security training
institutions (private, academic or governmental) exist that
support and train critical infrastructure asset personnel
1.83
2.33
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organizations, managers in governmental organizations and
heads of information technology departments may falla-
ciously believe that “information security management can
and should be achieved by consulting firms” [36].
 Root cause 7: A report by the State Supervisory Council [34]
emphasizes the lack of internal audit procedures and
processes; in particular, some critical infrastructure assets
do not even have internal audit units. A report on the
Turkish national cyber security exercise [30] points out
inherent audit problems in the participant organizations.
Fourteen critical infrastructure assets from the telecom-
munications, finance and public services sectors partici-
pated in the national cyber security exercise.
 Root cause 8: According to an evaluation of the results of
information security management projects in eight critical
governmental organizations, top-level managers do not
see themselves responsible for information security [36];
five of the eight analyzed organizations were critical infra-
structure assets. Enterprise-wide information security was
delegated to the heads of information technology depart-
ments by top-level managers. In another case, standard
information security principles were violated [37]. There-
fore, information security governance principles are not
followed at critical infrastructure assets, meaning that
information security is not seen as a part of corporate
governance and business strategies [38,39].
 Root cause 9: The lack of information security management
systems was the first finding of the national cyber security
exercise [30]. According to the exercise report, organiza-
tions do not perform risk analyses, which are an essential
part and the starting point of risk management efforts [40].
 Root cause 10: According to the national cyber security
exercise report [30], some exercise participants did not
consider security as a main design principle during system
Table 2 (continued )
Root cause of susceptibility to cyber threats Maturity criterion ðiÞ Average weight of
maturity criterion
ðWiÞ
25. Cyber security and information technology curricula
exist at all educational levels, from elementary schools to
universities
26. Special positions exist for cyber security experts in
critical infrastructure assets
1.67
Relationship management practices with product/
service providers are inadequate in governmental critical
infrastructure assets
27. National and sectoral product and service procurement
standards and rules exist for critical infrastructure assets
2.67
28. Established system for certifying the eligibility of
information technology companies that provide services to
critical infrastructure assets
2.17
29. Security standards exist for information technology
products used in critical infrastructure assets
1.83
Information technology audit mechanisms are very
limited or are not implemented in governmental critical
infrastructure assets
30. National and sectoral regulations exist that enforce
internal and external audits of critical infrastructure assets
2.67
31. Regular cyber security audits are performed by
regulatory authorities of the various critical infrastructure
sectors
3.00
32. Experienced information technology auditors are
employed by the internal audit units of critical
infrastructure assets
1.67
33. Sanctions are imposed by regulatory authorities on
critical infrastructure assets for nonconformance
1.83
Managers of governmental critical infrastructure assets
do not perceive information security as an area of
responsibility
34. Regulations exist that make the top-level management
of critical infrastructure assets responsible for cyber
security
2.83
Methodical and formal risk management processes are
not conducted at governmental critical infrastructure
assets
35. Regulations exist that require critical infrastructure
assets to conduct cyber security risk management
processes
3.00
36. Critical infrastructure assets adhere to a comprehensive
security standard such as ISO 27001
2.17
Security is considered by governmental critical
infrastructure assets to be an add-on, not a design
construct
37. Regulations exist that impose minimum security
countermeasures in critical infrastructure assets
2.50
38. Regulations exist that set the properties of information
systems and security countermeasures in critical
infrastructure assets
2.33
39. Sector-specific technical guidance documents exist for
the secure design, set-up and operation of computer
networks in critical infrastructure assets
1.50
40. National and sectoral standards exist that specify
security best practices for critical infrastructure assets
1.83
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design. The same problem was noted in the audit report of
the State Supervisory Council [34], which recommends the
consideration of security requirements during the
design phase.
3.2. Extraction of criteria using a Delphi survey
A Delphi survey of six experts was conducted to determine
the maturity criteria associated with the root causes and their
weight values. Two experts were from the private sector and
had ten and fifteen years of cyber security experience,
respectively. Two experts were from a governmental research
institute and had five and fourteen years of cyber security
experience, respectively. Two experts were from academia;
both of them had fifteen years of experience.
The Delphi survey was conducted by sending emails to the
six experts separately to ensure their anonymity [41]. Con-
trolled opinion feedback was supplied to the respondents
between the phases [42]. The survey involved five iterations.
Significant consensus among the experts was achieved after
five iterations [43].
The Delphi survey identified 40 maturity criteria. Table 2
shows the maturity criteria for each root cause; their weights
are listed in the third column. The weight of each criterion
was computed as the arithmetic mean of the individual
scores provided by the six experts.
3.3. Maturity model and survey results for Turkey
The following simple linear additive evaluation model is used
to compute the maturity level of critical infrastructure pro-





i ¼ 1 Wi  AiPm





where p is the total number of survey participants, m is the
total number of maturity criteria or principles (m¼40 in this
work), Wi is the weight of maturity criterion i and Ai is the
weight of the selected answer choice for criterion i.
Note that the numerator represents the maturity percen-
tage as evaluated by a single survey participant. The final
maturity level is the arithmetic mean of the evaluations of all
the survey participants.
The maturity levels are presented as percentage values,
which are more flexible and meaningful to government
officials compared with Likert scale values. The Cyber Power
Index [14] and the Cyber Maturity in Asia-Pacific Region
studies [13] also use percentage values to represent maturity
levels. The two studies measure the maturity of cyber
capabilities of various countries and are intended to be used
by policy makers.
The proposed maturity model is called the Vulnerability-
Driven National Cyber Security Maturity Model because the
maturity criteria are based on the extracted root causes. The
model can also be categorized as a survey-based maturity
assessment method. The other numerical values used in the
national level cyber security maturity evaluation were the
values of the answer choices provided by the survey partici-
pants. The existence of each criterion (principle) was checked
by each survey participant according to the three answer
choices based on the Likert scale shown in Table 3. A country
received zero points for no action or a very limited action, one
point for a partial action and two points for a comprehensive
action.
Table 3 was also used to compute the Global Cybersecurity
Index [11]. The approach used for computing the Global
Cybersecurity Index is most similar to the one used by the
proposed maturity model in terms of its content. The Global
Cybersecurity Index is the only study that scores countries
exclusively according to their cyber security efforts. There-
fore, the same evaluation table was selected to facilitate
reliable comparisons of the two approaches.
Before conducting the maturity survey, the 40 maturity
criteria were converted into questions (Wi, i¼1..40). For each
question Wi, the three choices for the answer Ai were
presented under the question based on Table 3.
The maturity survey was performed with ten participants
(p¼10), who worked at governmental organizations or were
former government officials. They participated in national
cyber security efforts such as the preparation and review of
the national strategy, national cyber security exercises and
preparation of national-level cyber security statutes. How-
ever, the survey results do not officially represent the matur-
ity level of Turkey because the survey was conducted by
researchers, not by the government.
A maturity survey would produce the most accurate
results if the questions were answered by the relevant
government officials. In general, country-level maturity sur-
veys are answered by experts and their answers are based on
publicly available data pertaining to the evaluated countries.
Publicly available data may be misleading because the real
preparedness levels and government intent can only be
known by the appropriate government officials.
Table 3 – Weight values for answer choices.
Answer choice ðAiÞ Explanation
0 No action or very limited action
1 Partial action
2 Comprehensive action
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Table 5 – Mappings of the model criteria.














Cyber security organization and/or coordinator (2, 5)      
National CSIRT organization (12, 14)      
Public–private partnerships (9)      
International cooperation and/or engagement (12)      
Regulations related to cyber security (30, 34, 35, 38)     
Cyber security program, strategy, plan and policy (1, 7)      
Information sharing and cooperation (10, 11, 13, 14)     
Certification, training, promotion of higher education and capacity building (22, 23, 24, 25, 26)     
Innovation, research and development programs (18)    
Audit, performance evaluation, exercises and benchmarking to measure cyber security
development (30, 31, 32)
   
Participation and engagement of the private sector (15, 16, 17, 19)   
Adoption of information security governance procedures by critical infrastructure assets (34)   
Adoption of (internationally approved) standards by critical infrastructure assets (29, 36, 40)   
Risk analysis and management of critical infrastructure assets (35)  
Critical review of and amendments to existing laws (20, 21)  
Budget for cyber security and/or national funding for research (4)  
Critical-infrastructure-focused CSIRT and sector-based CSIRTs (6, 11) 
Nationwide and/or sector-wide risk analysis and management processes (8) 
National and/or sectoral product and service procurement standards or rules (27, 38) 
Sector-specific technical guidance documents for the secure design, set-up and operation of
computer networks (39)

Certification scheme for information technology companies eligible to provide information
technology services to critical infrastructure assets (28)

Cyber security consultant (cyber czar) to the president or prime minister of a country (3) 
Minimum security countermeasures for critical infrastructure assets imposed by regulations
(37)

Sanctions imposed by regulatory authorities on critical infrastructure assets for
nonconformance (33)

Technical infrastructure for intra- and inter-sector information sharing (13) 
Public awareness programs    
Situational awareness mechanisms 
Rapid reaction mechanisms 
Identification of appropriate experts and policymakers in government, private sector and
academia






































































Table 4 shows the results of the maturity survey along
with the individual maturity percentages. Specifically, the
cyber security maturity of the Turkish critical infrastructure
protection efforts is assessed as 20.85%.
It is worth noting that the maturity percentage of Turkey
was 64.7% according to the Global Cybersecurity Index com-
puted by the International Telecommunication Union [11]. In
fact, Turkey received the seventh highest score among the 29
levels in the study. The considerable difference between the
maturity levels of two studies may result from the levels of
detail of the analyses. The proposed Vulnerability-Driven
National Cyber Security Maturity Model evaluates the orga-
nizational structures, CSIRTs, regulatory infrastructure, etc.
On the other hand, the Global Cybersecurity Index considers
the existence of these entities and features, not their details.
For example, the Global Cybersecurity Index only checks if
the national and sectoral CSIRTs are legally mandated and
the ability of the national CSIRT to gather its own intelli-
gence. In contrast, the proposed maturity model considers
the following detailed criteria for a CSIRT:
 A CSIRT dedicated to the protection of critical infrastruc-
tures exists.
 Sector-based CSIRTs with information sharing responsibil-
ities specified in regulations exist.
 An internationally recognized national CSIRT that coop-
erates with other national CSIRTs exists.
 A technical infrastructure supporting intra- and inter-
sector information sharing needs (e.g., online information
sharing portals, statistics dashboards, data collection cen-
ters) exists.
 A national CSIRT that handles cyber incident warnings
related to critical infrastructures exists and it coordinates
with the relevant sectoral CSIRTs and critical infrastruc-
ture assets when necessary.
The scope of the proposed maturity model is the cyber
security posture of national critical infrastructures. However,
the scope of the Global Cybersecurity Index is the general
cyber security efforts of countries. This could also be a reason
for the difference between the results.
Turkey has a Cyber Power Index of 30.4%, ranking it #15
among the nineteen countries evaluated [14]. This percentage
value is close to the value of 20.85% obtained using the
proposed model. However, the theme of the Cyber Power
Index is broader than cyber security. In fact, there are four
categories in the Cyber Power Index. The criteria related to
cyber security – as well as some other criteria that are not
related to cyber security – come under the legal and regulatory
framework category. The maturity level of Turkey is 49.2% for
this category. However, the ranking of Turkey for this category
does not change despite its relatively higher maturity. Again,
differences in the details of the two models may be the reason
for the difference in the maturity percentages. The criteria
(principles) underlying the Cyber Power Index are also not as
well detailed as for the Global Cybersecurity Index. Addition-
ally, other criteria included in the legal and regulatory frame-
work, such as intellectual property protection, may be a reason
for the relatively high maturity level.
Although the proposed maturity model is based on data
specific to Turkey, it can produce useful results for countries
that are similar to Turkey in terms of organizational and
legislative characteristics. However, before conducting a sur-
vey for another country, the weight values of the criteria
should be reviewed and modified appropriately by experts
from the country of interest.
4. Comparison with other models
Maturity models are compared in terms of their maturity
criteria. In order to perform comparisons, similar criteria
must be generalized to produce a maturity theme.
Table 5 presents the maturity themes and criteria that are
related to critical infrastructure protection and incorporated
in at least one maturity model. The numbers in parentheses
in the first column of Table 5 are the sequence numbers of
the relevant criteria of the proposed maturity model. Table 2
lists the criteria underlying the proposed maturity model
along with their sequence numbers.
The proposed maturity model provides multiple, thorough
criteria for CSIRT organization, national level organization,
capacity building, cyber security legislation, and audit and
risk management. The first ten criteria are commonly used in
other maturity models as well as in the proposed maturity
model. The next six criteria are less commonly used in other
maturity models. The following nine criteria are unique to
the proposed maturity model. The next five criteria are not
included in the proposed model, although they are included
in other maturity models. Public awareness is a commonly
used criterion, but it is not considered in the proposed
maturity model. The reason is that the proposed model is
specifically designed to evaluate governmental critical infra-
structure protection efforts.
5. Conclusions
This paper has proposed the Vulnerability-Driven National
Cyber Security Maturity Model for measuring the readiness
levels of national critical infrastructure protection efforts.
The model is the first academic effort to measure the
maturity level of country-level efforts related to critical
infrastructure protection. Although the maturity model is
based on data specific to Turkey, it can produce accurate
results for countries that are similar to Turkey with regard to
cyber security studies, technical infrastructure and the legis-
lative environment. However, before conducting a survey, the
weights of the maturity criteria must be reviewed and
adjusted by individuals with strong expertise related to the
countries being assessed.
The root causes extracted from the available data using
grounded theory are limited by the opinions of interviewees,
collected documents and the theoretical sensitivity of the
researchers. The maturity criteria and their weights are
dependent on the opinions of the experts participating in
the Delphi survey. The maturity percentage of Turkey calcu-
lated in this work is dependent on the answers provided by
the participating government officials. However, the
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calculated maturity level is unofficial because the survey was
conducted as part of a government-funded research project,
not as an official Turkish government study.
The proposed maturity model is specifically designed to
assess the maturity of national critical infrastructure protec-
tion efforts. Domains such as combating cyber crime, military
cyber operations and privacy protection are not directly
associated with critical infrastructure protection [44]. There-
fore, these domains are outside the scope of this research and
the proposed maturity model. Likewise, the vulnerabilities
associated with the physical security of critical infrastructure
assets are out of scope. In fact, the criteria related to these
domains are excluded from the comparison table (Table 5).
Future research will attempt to extract and model depen-
dencies between the root causes with the goal of devising a
maturity model that takes the dependencies into account.
Indeed, key dependencies exist among the root causes. For
example, the number of qualified cyber security experts in a
country depends on the perceptions of cyber security by the
government and the private sector.
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